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GaryJ. Simson*

INTRODUCTION
New Directions in Choice of Law:
Alternatives to Interest Analysis

The past three decades have witnessed what enthusiasts and detractors alike have come to call a "revolution" in choice of law in the United
States.' Long dominant throughout the various states, the traditional
methodology of place of wrong, place of making, and the like has
yielded considerable ground in state courts to a variety of modem
approaches. 2 Fundamental to these various approaches is a method that
Brainerd Currie, its principal architect, called "governmental interest
'3
analysis."
Not surprisingly in light of its "revolutionary" impact on judicial
practice, governmental interest analysis has been the focal point of
scholarly debate in choice of law since Currie launched it with a remarkable flurry of articles in the late 1950s and early 1960s. 4 Its merits and
demerits have been hotly contested in numerous articles and more than
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1. See, e.g., Korn, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: A Critique, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 772
(1983); Sedler, The Governmental Interest Approach to Choice of Law: An Analysis and a
Reformulation, 25 UCLA L. REV. 181, 181 (1977).
2. The traditional rules have hardly disappeared entirely from the scene, particularly with regard to matters other than contract and tort. Nonetheless, the inroads
made by modern approaches are quite impressive. For an overview of the states'

approaches, see G.
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AND MATERIALS 13-14 (2d ed. 1991).
3. See generally B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws (1963).
4. See id
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a few symposia. 5 With no intention of suggesting that further debate on
governmental interest analysis might not bear additional fruit, I and the
other officers for 1990-91 of the Association of American Law Schools
Section on Conflict of Laws resolved to try to broaden the focus of conflicts debate by having the speakers at the Section's annual program
respond to the question: if Currie's interest analysis is not the answer,
then what is?
The Section had the very good fortune of securing as speakers three
conflicts scholars who, I believe, would appear at or near the top of
almost any conflicts teacher's list of scholars best-suited to answer this
question-R. Lea Brilmayer of Yale Law School, Larry B. Kramer of The
University of Chicago Law School, and Joseph W. Singer of Boston University School of Law. The program, which took place in Washington,
D.C. on January 5, 1991, was unusually well-attended and (at least from
the perspective of this far from disinterested moderator and Section
chair) very well-received. The first three contributions to this symposium are somewhat revised versions of the papers delivered by Professors Brilmayer, Kramer, and Singer. The fourth and final contribution
is an essay that I have written at the invitation of the editors of this Journal, some of whom have had the dubious honor of hearing me outline an
alternative approach at the conclusion of the choice-of-law materials in
my conflict of laws course. My essay is not intended to be a "response"
to the three papers, but rather an effort of the same kind.

5. For an excellent symposium and plentiful source of citations to the literature
on interest analysis, see Symposium on Interest Analysis in Conflict of Laws: An Inquiry into
Fundamentalswith a Side Glance at Products Liability, 46 OHio ST. LJ. 457 (1985).

